Introduction
In the literature, both cosmopolitanism and patriotism are contested and multifaceted terms.
1 Cosmopolitanism, to list just a few possibilities, can denote the sociocultural condition brought about by globalization; a philosophy promoting human brotherhood; a political project of international cooperation and global citizenship; a personal attitude of valuing difference; and a set of practices and competences in (multi)cultural consumption (Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 8-14) . There are descriptive and normative aspects of cosmopolitanism and the distinction between the two is not always clear. 2 Similarly, there is a whole set of patriotisms (Viroli 1995) , from the ancient Roman imperative of absolute dedication to the glory of the Republic or the Empire to the various modern forms. These in turn may hinge on either nation or state (ethnic and civic patriotism), sometimes retaining the old connection to militarism, sometimes replacing the latter with a more 'civilian' orientation towards promoting the community's wellbeing. The most discussed version in contemporary political philosophy is Habermas' "constitutional patriotism".
Although cosmopolitanism and patriotism are not always taken as opposites, cosmopolitanism generally indicates allegiance to the world community of humankind as against particularistic ties, so that it always involves a tension with moral obligations to one's local origins and group memberships (Lamont and Aksartova 2002: 2) . This obviously can include the patriotic bond as well. Even if we allow that patriotism is not the same as nationalism -which is another long-lasting controversy -the question of how to combine it with cosmopolitanism, and whether this is possible at all, remains open.
To make things more complicated, in addition to being topics of philosophical reflection and theoretical debate, cosmopolitanism and patriotism are feelings and attitudes of real people in real social contexts, points of reference that guide them, for better or for worse, in their everyday and not-so-everyday actions. Of all the possible approaches to studying cosmopolitanism and patriotism developed in the social sciences and humanities, and there are many indeed, the one best suited to our purposes is what may be called the practice approach. According to this view, both cosmopolitanism and patriotism are not (only) ready-made analytic categories but social practices, discursive and nondiscursive, that social actors use in particular contexts which are defined historically, politically, and culturally. Their semantic substance, as well as their performative power, are shifting and context-dependent, because both cosmopolitanism and patriotism are (also) a kind of language actors use to communicate with other actors, in a given society, on the basis of a set of shared assumptions and participating in one or more ongoing social games.
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Taking Serbia as an example, patriotism and cosmopolitanism have been used quite directly, and explicitly, by participants in social and political struggles. Descending from the rarefied realm of theory into messy real life, the two concepts have become vivid labels for specific political positions, and groups of people taking them. Whether used to name "us" and exalt the values of one's own group, or to name "them" and stigmatize what the opponents stand for, patriotism and cosmopolitanism have long served as potent discursive weapons in the struggle for various kinds of power in Serbia. While they retain some of their significance to this day, we shall argue that the peak of their intensive and consequential employment in public discourse occurred between 2005 and 2010. 4 In this paper, we are interested in the symbolic battles recently fought in Serbia over the foundations of political community. Hence, instead of starting from precise definitions of cosmopolitanism and patriotism we are looking into the different ways the two notions are talked about in the public sphere. What does it mean to be a true patriot in Serbia between 2005 and 2010 ? Conversely, what does it mean to be a true cosmopolitan? What is the relation between the two positions in Serbian public discourse? What kind of state do the patriots acknowledge and strive for? On the other side, what precisely is this world that the cosmopolitans invoke so often? And from both positions, how is the relation of the state (Serbia) and the world described and prescribed? What is the place of culture in all that?
For analysis we selected two very prominent outlets for intellectual debate -the journal Nova srpska politička misao (hereafter NSPM) and the radio program and periodical publication Peščanik. They illustrate rather clearly the "patriotic" and the "cosmopolitan" position, respectively. The initial sample 5 comprised five issues of NSPM which, according to their titles, could be expected to bear on the subject of the present analysis 6 and the publication Peščanik FM (transcripts of the Peščanik radio program from 2005 to 2009). For the purposes of the present analysis, the sample was expanded to include texts posted at the nspm.rs website during this period, and Peščanik's Godišnji almanah (Yearbook) collecting the key texts 4 Serbian society in the second half of 2000s was shaken by numerous struggles over the country's foreign policy orientation on the outside, and over the bases on which to build the political community from within. During these years, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was dissolved; in 2008 the former Serbian province of Kosovo proclaimed independence; a new Constitution was adopted (2006); political parties oscillated continuously in their foreign policy, turning to the EU, then Russia, China, and countries of the former "Third World" (or even all of the above -as in the so-called doctrine of the "four pillars" of Serbian foreign policy promoted by the incumbent coalition government and the President Boris Tadić); the balance between (European) integration and nationalist isolation was tipped a few times. 5 The original data was gathered during the research for the Center for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe's project "Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia", funded by RRPP. 6 The issues are: Kosovo and Serbia's European identity, Democracy in Serbia after 2000, the special edition Cultural Policy in Serbia, all from 2008, and Culture and the Media in the (Post)Global Era from 2010). One of the issues from the original sample, upon closer inspection, turned out not to be sufficiently relevant in terms of the research topic.
posted on the pescanik.net in the year 2008. The broadening of the sample was introduced in order to reduce genre imbalance, since the data representing the two ideological sides were initially not sufficiently comparable in terms of the kind of discourse they comprised. On one side (Peščanik), we had transcribed talks in a radio show, i.e. oral communication transformed into text, and on the other (NSPM) a scholarly journal publishing (more or less) regularly formatted papers. It is reasonable to suppose that the internal rules of the latter genre urged, but also enabled, the authors to present their argument more carefully and develop it more fully than was available to speakers at Peščanik, who acted in the heat of the moment. By including material from the two websites this asymmetry was somewhat reduced, but these methodological reservations should be kept in mind.
Nova srpska politička misao
The first impression gained by reading the articles published in this journal did not support the assumption that NSPM played a major role in reviving the concept of patriotism and introducing patriotic discourse into public debates. Patriotism as a concept almost never appears explicitly in the inspected journal issues, although it is referred to indirectly in some of the papers discussing cultural policy, democracy building, or the Kosovo problem. Cosmopolitanism on the other hand is brought up much more directly, most often in negative terms by attacking the falsely cosmopolitan false elite. However, bringing in the texts posted on the nspm.rs website changed the first impression considerably, as much more direct references to patriotism were patently there.
In the first quote we will be looking at patriotism is not explicitly mentioned but is hinted at in the idea that protecting national interests in Kosovo is a precondition for internal democracy and normality, 7 as opposed to "pragmatic realism" (i.e. the claim that it is more reasonable for Serbia to comply with Western pressure and recognize Kosovo's independence) which would result in bolstering authoritarian tendencies in society, encouraging corruption and making the legal system even more fragile. (Nakarada 2008: 14-15) Here, normalcy, democracy and stability are placed at the side of the patriotic position (the one that maintains that Kosovo is and must remain part of Serbia), while pragmatic realism, as mere consenting to what is imposed ("with no critical reflection") reinforces authoritarianism and debilitates the state. In some papers, the defense of national integrity of Serbia in Kosovo is interpreted as the assertion of Serbia's European, transnational identity. (Koljević 2008a: 26, 28) Here we are already tracing a discursive strategy we are going to come upon many more times in our analysis. It is a more or less coherent integration of the adversary's view into one's own argument, with the effect of delegitimizing the rival's position. In this particular case, by arguing that defending the national identity in Kosovo means simultaneously defending the transnational identity through anti-imperialism, that is, that true patriotism is also at once cosmopolitanism, the binary opposition national-transnational is pulled down, and the idea that Serbia's EU accession is incompatible with insistence on a Serbian Kosovo, is subverted from a rather unexpected angle.
9 At the same time, instead of the "hybrid virtual model of Euro-American globalist individualism", the "true" cosmopolitanism (understood as transnationalism) is linked to the struggle against Western hegemony. On this view, patriotism is love of one's fatherland which ranks the same as attachment to family and nation, to that which is close to us, but all that together leads to general virtues. Only in this way, the author contends, can justice, international order and human rights be secured (patriotism = national interest + cosmopolitanism = democracy).
The argument that the national interest is an indispensable ingredient of patriotism figured in a 2007 debate on patriotism which unfolded in the media and was subsequently put together by the NSPM editors and posted at their website as a collection of texts. It was launched by Nebojša Krstić, then an advisor to the President of the Republic. (Ćirjaković, internet) In the second quote we find a new formula: patriotism = national interest -fighting for Kosovo, which helps us, through the responses that ensued, to gain more insight into what patriotism and national interest mean for other participants in this debate. Kosovo (and Metohija) (Pavić, internet) Here we see that patriotism assumes the care for the national interest, which in this particular case necessarily involves the protection of Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo, the most intimate, central value of the political community we must not "turn our back on." Values are important indeed and in the next round of the debate Đorđe Vukadinović introduces new (and final) restrictions on what it means to be acting in an "elementary patriotic" way.
Slobodan Antonić and

Zoran Ćirjaković is asking if the attitude to the future status of
So, when the whole argumentative chain is traced ending up in just two alternative options (Euro-Atlantic integrations OR keeping Kosovo within Serbia), there is really only one way out, in Vukadinović's opinion. We have thus arrived at the conclusive formula: patriotism = national interest = Kosovo.
Closely related to the dangers threatening territorial integrity is the danger threatening the concept of patriotism itself. This idea is put forward frequently by the authors on this side of the symbolic front. NSPM editor Slobodan Antonić begins his paper published in the scholarly journal Teme thus: "In Serbia today there is no word more slandered than patriotism" (Antonić 2008b: 713 (Divjak, internet) Moreover, people who would want to nurture patriotism see themselves as the victims of the unpatriotic (civic) elite, which prevents them from acting patriotically and is annoyed by all that is national. In the two following quotes, patriotism is one more time described by words taken from the emotional register, as something intimate, a need of the individual to belong, in the cold modern world, by way of the feeling of national pride.
The Olympics is always a time of reinvigorated patriotism. Yet what happens in a country in which a part of the elite thinks that every patriotism is nationalism, and every nationalism fascism? In such a country the Olympics is one more opportunity to launch an attack on national symbols -from the anthem to the ways of saying hello (…) what comes next?
Will the very name of the country be changed? Really, why should this country be called Serbia? Why not simply "Citizenia", so that everything may be perfectly "politically correct"?(…) Let this people feel its national pride, at least during the Olympics. This is neither "nationalism" nor "militarism". This is patriotism. And if someone finds this feeling alien, he or she should not spoil it for others. (Antonić, internet 2) Other NSPM authors also have something to say about this denationalized elite. Reviewing the book by Slobodan Samardžić Gradnja i razgradnja države (Building and Unbuilding the State), Bogdana Koljević refers indirectly to cosmopolitanism, delegitimizing its proponents, the "heteronomous elites", in a twofold way: first, they are not legitimate representatives of the cosmopolitan elite -instead, they are pseudo-elites incapable of truly understanding the "world" (delegitimation of membership), and, second, they misconstrue their own role in cultural policy, which should consist in maintaining the connection to the "authentic cultural institutions" and promoting the specific traits of their own country (delegitimation of goals and values). (Koljević 2008b: 245) The cosmopolitan pseudo-elite described in this way appears often in NSPM papers. Thus in the special issue titled Cultural Policy in Serbia we find it again, under the label "immature elites", "missionary intelligentsia", and in the comical character of the "provincial cosmopolitan" 10 . (Kanjevac 2008: 53) The legitimacy of the local cosmopolitan elite is attacked by pointing to its hidden (material) interests, and to alleged purpose of their activity in the media field, described as colonization -leading the rest of the population into cultural, ideological and moral slavery, while they themselves can afford the life of the "European middle class". (Gajić 2010: 39) Cultural policy was the main subject of the above mentioned special issue of NSPM, a frequent topic of pieces posted on the nspm.rs website, and a special rubric. This brings us to one more field of symbolic contestation over dominant meanings and policies in Serbia: What kind of culture does this society need? (Vladušić 2008: 126-127) As can be seen, NSPM authors mainly propose the preservation of imperiled national arts and culture, that is, a cultural policy serving patriotic purposes and pursuing the goal of protecting an "authentic" culture from the invading mass, industrial culture, along with its protagonists -the uprooted elites, described above.
Summing up the main conclusions of the analysis of the NSPM corpus: although this ideological current was rather close to the government in power at that time, NSPM writers present their own values and opinions as being if not minoritarian (because they often speak in the name of the people) then certainly threatened. In the picture of Serbia gleaned from Nova srpska politička misao, a whole set of agents are imperiled: the state -by the problem of Kosovo, the society -by the colonizing pseudo-elites, culture -by the imperialist mass culture coming from the West; national identity is defamed, patriotism maligned. In this discourse, patriotism is mostly understood in an ethnonational sense, as love of and loyalty to the existing state understood as the embodiment of the nation, and a desire to protect the national interest. Cosmopolitanism is understood in a number of ways, sometimes in a more inclusive fashion (the true cosmopolitanism is patriotism, the two are not mutually exclusive but are connected), at other times more negatively (as cultural imperialism). The genuineness of the cosmopolitan identity of the rival group (the "missionary intelligentsia", Other Serbia, pseudo-elites, transnational elites) is seriously disputed and their delegitimation is attempted on the basis of membership, values, and goals. The global framework is persistently invoked, with two opposing purposes -either to legitimate the patriotic position, or to present the latter as jeopardized by this same framework. Antiglobalism appears often, but what also appears are references to universal human values and the heritage of democracy in different parts of the world.
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Peščanik
While, as we have seen, in NSPM they think patriotism is menaced in Serbia, most participants in the Peščanik radio program say it is them who is menaced by such overdrawn insistence on patriotism. What arises repeatedly in these quotes is pointing to the political continuity with the 1990s ("advocates of crimes", "criminals", "scums and scoundrels"), and arguing that patriotic discourse is threatening the society ("scavenger patriotism", the society as "hostage to intransparent internal power" in patriotic guise). We see a set of strategies to delegitimate the proponents of patriotism at the other side of the symbolic divide. Throughout the five years of this radio program that we studied the drive to question the legitimacy of the bearers of the official patriotic discourse never subsided. The true patriots are, in fact, at the other side -they are the ones who have been excluded from making decisions on the national interest, but who have actually done for their country much more than the usurpers and the monopolists. Many speakers in Peščanik stress it is precisely them who "really love their country", and therefore they reject the role of the "nationally suspect" and "traitors". True, not all speakers at Peščanik take pains to stress how much they love their country. Still, it doesn't mean they do not nurture emotions towards it and to the imperative to be loyal to it. Peščanik FM Vol. 7, 2006: 235) All these quotes provide good examples of the struggle over defining the very concept of patriotism and over what it means to act in a patriotic way and in the country's interest. This must be viewed in conjunction with the normative visions of how the state should be and of the foundations on which to construct the political community. So even the speakers who didn't care to present themselves as Serbia's fans tended to limit their negative feelings to its current condition rather than extend it to Serbia as such ("I am ashamed to have such a state, as it is now" What the speakers at Peščanik basically argue is that it is necessary to build a functional democratic state, which must not be integrated on an ethnic basis; moreover, instead of the national or state interest what really exists is only the citizens' interests (safety, justice, affluence). This position comes close to what is known in theory under the label of constitutional patriotism, unlike the ethnonational one we encountered in the discourse analysis of NSPM.
Furthermore, while the symbolic-geographic center of the authors represented in NSPM is in Serbia and Kosovo, and they look at the world mainly through an antiglobalist (or sometimes alter-globalist) lens, the Peščanik speakers are primarily oriented to Europe (=European Union) and the world (=the Western civilization). Just as the Serbia of Peščanik (ironically called "Citizenia" by Slobodan Antonić) is different from the one that NSPM is talking about, so their "world" tends to be different. It is resolutely Western-centered and, for many speakers -although by no means all of them -it excludes the "uncivilized".
. Pešča-nik FM 12, 2008: 108) In the last quote the thing to note is that the speaker identifies simultaneously with Western civilization ("our Western civilization") and with a particular society ("when we compare this to ourselves", "what a huge job is awaiting us"), which illustrates very well the position of the politically engaged Peščanik speakers, who claim they want to do something for their country. In order for them to act in accordance with their views, they must fight for the identity of the political community they belong to and reappropriate the meaning it has been assigned. By strategically doubly emphasizing that the Western civilization is our civilization from which we have fallen, but into which we ought to return, both the fundamental definitions of the nature of the society and the policies that should be pursued accordingly, are redefined at once.
Isolation from Europe and the world which was in force throughout the 1990s but continued also during the better part of the 2000s is the crucial societal problem identified by the Peščanik speakers. In their opinion, the fact that cosmopolitan, universal values are not firmly rooted in the population detracts from the moral quality of the Serbian society from within (cosmopolitanism = democracy). The We often invoked in the Peščanik discourse is also rather interesting and deserves closer inspection. It tends to include (although in negative terms) all members of the political community (understood as either the Serbian nation or citizens of Serbia) juxtaposed to the world with which they are compared. In other words, the We is usually not limited to just "one's own side" in the symbolic battle. If we followed the methodological suggestions of critical discourse analysis, especially van Dijk's "ideological square," 13 we would be at a loss: this group of, let us call them "internal outsiders", 14 seem to be employing a novel strategy, a strategy of negatively representing one's own group which Van Dijk's methodological device does not allow for. This kind of strategy is, no doubt, characteristic of the "missionary intelligentsia", to use the term coined by the rival camp. Yet instead of insisting on this group's "badmouthing their own people" as NSPM writers are fond of doing, it is far more interesting to note that by constructing a We in this way the Peščanik speakers actually self-identify as primarily members of this political community rather than voluntary outlaws from it. Due to the deep identity cleavages in the Serbian society (Naumović 2005) , this is not always readily perceived. Moreover, such self-positioning may be related to frequent emphasizing of their own patriotism on this side of political divide as well ("And I really see myself as a much bigger Serb than any of the guys in those black cassocks") in the struggle to define the bases on which to effect political integration.
Hence this type of identification can be said to involve two different ranges, or two degrees of "We": a larger, more encompassing WE (the political community), and a more restricted, ideologically delimited "we". The formula goes as follows: WE = we + they.
Of course, there are other types of self-identification in Peščanik discourse as well. Quite often the more ordinary Us vs. Them situation is present, deploying the usual discursive strategies of positively representing one's own group while negatively representing the opponent. In this case the We is more narrowly defined, while They are described in more concrete terms. In the following examples, They are the "new young" -the xenophobic generation growing up since the 1990s, or, alternatively, "ordinary Serbs": (Luković in: Peščanik FM 9, 2007: 140) Whether this group is described in relatively mild terms, as in the first quote, or the speaker clearly takes his/her distances, depicting them in extremely negative light like in the other two, the isolation from, ignorance of, and a basic incompatibility with the world are seen as being at the heart of the problem. As long as They are that way, of course the World will treat Them, that is, (again) "US" in the larger sense. person, very slowly and carefully. (Srbljanović in: Peščanik Vol. 12, 2008: 188) The wealth of metaphors used to describe the attitude of the World to "US", as well as our image in this world borrowed from the psychiatric register (lunatics, immature children, retarded, ought to be steered) witnesses to what extent the isolation from the world is a sore point for the speakers whose identity is founded importantly on reference points located outside the society they feel they only belong to by chance of destiny. This is also a reflection of political positioning towards the state policy to which, whether proclaiming themselves patriotic or not, the Peščanik speakers refuse to be loyal.
In this section we have talked about the relation of Peščanik speakers to the world, universal values, Western civilization and forms of social order and political action within these frameworks, all of them in concurrence with cosmopolitanism. However, leaving aside societal macro-structures and state policies, the discourse of cosmopolitanism as the identification of a particular individual, rather than the whole society, appeared very rarely in the data, just in a couple of instances. We are quoting all of them here for purposes of illustration. The speakers report strong emotions of joy ("in this way I came back to myself", a "wonderful", "heavenly feeling") caused in them by personal cosmopolitan practices, real or imagined. But here again, in the subtext there is the implication that these people have realized these practices in spite of Serbia, or that Serbia is the cause of their failure to happen -even the dream of such a banal thing as a Starbucks at Terazije was spoilt by the appearance of Radoš Ljušić and Legija which turned it into a ludicrous nightmare.
I had a dream of sitting in a Starbucks
Conclusions
Closing our analysis, let us compare more systematically the discourse of Peščanik to that of NSPM, particularly the ways patriotism is treated in the two. Just like NSPM authors, Peščanik speakers also present their values and views as threatened: they are the ones under attack, besieged and repressed by negative forces which do not wish well to either democracy or the Serbian society. Then, references to patriotism abound, and there is a kind of self-vindication through claims that they are the true patriots. The idea of patriotism as such is hence not renounced but its content is redefined, by suggesting new meanings to the term to replace the ones found too suspect of nationalism. Conversely, the concept of national interest hardly ever figures in the discursive constructions of the political community in Peščanik. Patriotism for them does not imply loyalty to the state as it is and uncritical promotion of its interests, but the construction of a high-quality, democratic state which would serve citizen interests. In other words, while in NSPM texts patriotism is seen as working towards preserving the given state (the issue of Kosovo is of foremost importance here), in Peščanik the state is yet to be built (through integration in the EU and the "world").
As much as NSPM talks about Kosovo, so Peščanik speaks of the world. Yet the main actors in these stories are not speakers themselves as individuals, but the Serbian state (or nation, or society) and international institutions. This cosmopolitanism is, so to speak, more political and collective than cultural and personal. The relation of Serbia to the world is likened to the relation of a bad pupil to a sometimes strict, sometimes benevolent teacher who is there to help the pupil. Integration of the Serbian society with the world is seen as a way to its recovery and moral healing. Hence genuine patriotism is actually cosmopolitanism.
To sum up, the two discourses both include the notion of patriotism as their major ingredient, although it remains more prominent in NSPM,
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15 To use the sociological jargon, in NSPM patriotism figures as an "independent variable", while in Peščanik it is more of a reactive, "dependent variable". Also, the solemn, humorless tone in which patriotism is discussed in NSPM (but generally not in Peščanik) suggests it is something the writers take very seriously.
with two different understandings of its ("true") meaning. One, espoused by NSPM, centers on the nation and the state, viewed as the embodiment and safeguard of the nation. The ethnonational substratum of this understanding is visible in continuous references to "the Serbs", Serbian history, qualities, achievements, and rights. Kosovo is so significant not just for having been legally part of the state territory but because it is considered the cradle of Serbian identity. Yet this ethnonationalism is not all there is. The NSPM discourse also takes pains to include legal arguments, including international law, to affirm its support for the values of human rights, equality and interethnic tolerance. It never openly questions minority rights (all "authentic cultures" ought to be promoted, not just the Serbian one) nor attacks individualism as such (only the selfishness of "missionary intelligentsia"). In this sense the ethnonational substratum is complemented by elements of something akin to "liberal nationalism" (Tamir 1993) . The way cosmopolitan motifs are weaved into the position of NSPM (Serbia should join the community of nations as an equal member, by remaining distinct, proud and mindful of its interests just as the great nations are) also conforms to the liberal nationalist image of the world as a mosaic of more or less self-contained nations.
The Peščanik construction of patriotism, on the other hand, comes closest to "constitutional patriotism", especially in the version recently proposed by Jan-Werner Müller (2007) . Constitutional patriotism is generally the allegiance to the political community based not on shared "blood" ties, historical destiny, cultural traditions or even territory, but on the democratic values enshrined in the Constitution and warranted by democratic institutions. While the values to which allegiance is pledged are basically universal, attachment is concretized to this state, this democratic system, this Constitution. Therefore constitutional patriotism is rooted rather than uprooted, has an important particularizing aspect, but does not rule out -it rather invites -critical reflection, ambivalence, irony, and doubt. What makes Müller's explication close to our case is, among other things, his stress on the role of the emotions: while "ordinary" (ethnic, national, liberal-national) patriotism is founded on the simple feeling of pride, constitutional patriotism is sustained by a host of diverse emotions, such as shame, indignation, spiritedness, anger, and guilt (Müller 2007: 62) . We have found many instances of such feelings in our data.
For Peščanik speakers, although patriotism -defined in this critical and reflexive way -is important, it is still true that cosmopolitanism is even more so, retaining the status of central reference point for their identity construction. Yet, their "world" is understood in a rather impoverished way, as basically reduced to Western Europe and North America. Although they undoubtedly seek to transcend the national context by reaching toward the universal, this universalism is not always upheld with consistency.
After reading the two sections of our analysis one gets the impression that they provide two completely different pictures of the Serbian society in the early 2000s, the basic principles of integration of its political community, and the course of future policies. It seems at times that what these two loose intellectual circles share are only the formal discursive strategies they employ (the most prominent being insistence on selfvictimhood and presentation of oneself as being threatened, real or feigned integration of the opponent's view into one's own, and various strategies of delegitimation), but otherwise any rapprochement is ruled out, as long as the ones talk about interests of the nation, and the others about European integration.
Yet this symbolic confrontation, coming out so clearly in the results of our discourse analysis, has in the meantime been rendered much less irreconcilable with the currently ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), combining in its rhetoric almost all the elements identified in this analysis, at both sides of the symbolic divide and including the subtleties of their mutual play of legitimation and counter-legitimation. They are pro-European in foreign policy, yet do not forget the national pride; they foreground the "interest of the citizens" yet it somehow always coincides with the interest of the state (and the latter, of course, with the interest of the Party); the coalition government in which they were the strongest partner stepped the long-tabooed line of engaging in direct negotiations with the Kosovo authorities, thereby practically recognizing the independence of the former Serbian province; their cultural policy is conservative and oldfashioned, yet Serbianness is publicly promoted not significantly more than was the case while the Democratic Party was dominant; the list could be continued, but this much suffices to outline the strange ways of symbolic battles in the Serbian public space at this moment. It will be more than interesting to continue following the story into the near future to see whether any new forms of symbolic contestation will be taken upon or new lines opened in the days to come.
